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Introduction
Thirty years ago, the rationing of healthcare was invisible
and silent. Recently, however, healthcare expenditures
have become a major focus of public policy. As we look for
ways to control spending, we become more aware of the
economic trade-offs involved in every healthcare decision.
Allocating resources to one service means less left for
other services; allocating resources to one patient means
less resources available for others. Rationing is becoming
more publicly visible and explicit at every level of the
healthcare system. However, in many intensive care units
(ICUs) rationing still remains silent – implicitly conducted
and inadequately discussed.
If we agree that healthcare resources are fixed and the
needs and demands for health resources are not [1], then
all resource allocation decisions are rationing decisions.
Rationing implies that, because of cost constraints, not
everyone will get every service they need, want, or even
deserve. Encouraging clinicians to become aware of
rationing in their own practice [2], Ubel and Goold sug-
gested that three conditions must be met to label an activ-
ity as bedside rationing: (1) physicians have control over
the use of a beneficial service; (2) they withhold, withdraw
or fail to offer a service that is in the patient’s best medical
interest; and (3) they act primarily to promote the interests
of someone other than the patient (this could be either the
physician, an organization, or society in general – by
reserving healthcare resources for other patients).
This editorial is for intensivists interested in reflecting on
the rationing of critical care services. Here we focus on (1)
how ICU resources are currently rationed; (2) basic princi-
ples at stake in our rationing decisions; and (3) our multi-
ple roles in the rationing process.
Levels of rationing decisions
Rationing decisions at all levels of healthcare affect who
gets what in the ICU. At the national, provincial or state
public policy level, investments in tertiary care hospitals
weigh against investments in other health and social ser-
vices such as primary care, education, and transportation.
For example, the UK has a relatively small healthcare
budget (approximately 6% of its gross national product in
1992 [3]) and allocates only 1–2% of hospital budgets to
intensive care. This is in contrast to the USA, where 15%
of gross national product is spent on healthcare and 20% of
this on intensive care [4]. At the level of healthcare admin-
istration, decisions must be made about where to locate
ICUs geographically among communities.
At the level of the hospital, resource allocation decisions
concern the infrastructure of the ICU (ie the number of
beds, staffing, availability of auxillary services such as
diagnostic imaging). Although a given ICU size and struc-
ture may be determined at the ‘macro’ level, the unit of
rationing most familiar to clinicians is the ICU bed at the
‘micro’, or clinical level. Here, rationing decisions concern
the allocation of patients to beds (ie admission, discharge)
and the allocation of services to patients. At the clinical
level, rationed resources may include technology, treat-
ment, ICU bed-days and hospital bed-days.
Macro-level resource allocation decisions create the
rationing dilemmas that clinicians face at the micro-level.
For instance, the more restricted the number of tertiary
hospitals and ICU beds in a community, the more difficult
ICU admission and discharge decisions become. If
rationing seems unacceptable at the clinical level, one
solution is to remove the resource constraint through
activism at the administrative or system-wide policy levels
[5]. Importantly, this does not obviate rationing, since it
simply addresses resources and trade-offs farther away
from the bedside.
How might rationing practices and principles be made
more conscious and articulate? Articulation (in place of the
traditional silence) will allow rationing acts to be better
challenged and justified to ourselves, to our colleagues,
and to our community. In the remainder of this editorial,
we focus primarily on rationing practices which involve
making trade-offs based on cost (or other resource) con-
straints. However, not only are resources are being traded
off, but principles are being traded off as well. Here we
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principles: (1) autonomy; (2) utility; and (3) equity. Given
the imperative to contain healthcare costs, intensivists are
frequently faced with tensions between these three prin-
ciples and we typically have to compromise one in the
service of another.
Autonomy
The principle of autonomy is reflected in the recent trend
toward healthcare planning in concert with patients’
values and preferences. The advance directives move-
ment exemplifies rationing according to the principle of
autonomy. Patients determine their own level of care, and
clinicians use these expressed wishes to direct resources
toward or away from a given patient.
Given cost control pressures, the principle of autonomy
can be most easily upheld if everyone had rather modest
wishes. However, in the extreme, autonomy requires that
even extravagant wishes be respected and met. Patient
autonomy can thus be at odds with physicians’ imperative
to benefit the patient, as in the case of requests for
unproven or useless treatments. Autonomy can also be at
odds with the physicians’ mandate to do no harm, as in the
case of requests for assisted suicide.
Utility
Under the strict principle of utilitarianism, ICU resources
would be distributed to individuals in such a way as to
maximize the net well-being of all ICU patients. Towards
this goal, we can reduce the use of minimally effective
tests or treatments, and choose interventions known to be
beneficial on the basis of rigorous research. We can also
seek the tests and treatments that achieve the diagnostic
or therapeutic goal for the least cost. However, utility-
based decisions may help or hinder cost control since
many very effective interventions are also very expensive
(eg treating patients with acute myocardial infarction with
tissue plasminogen activator over streptokinase when both
are available, when the former is more effective yet more
costly).
The principle of utility can conflict with autonomy, in that
some patients may prefer less effective treatments. In
practice, net population health (ie utility) may be compro-
mised slightly by preventing undue suffering of a few seri-
ously ill individuals. This principle has been described as
distributive justice [6], and has been adapted by ethicists
to debate health rationing dilemmas [7].
Equity
The third principle of equity relates to the concept of fair-
ness. The basic idea is that burdens (eg morbidity, mortal-
ity, costs of healthcare) and benefits (eg health, wellbeing,
a chance to recover) are distributed fairly across individu-
als and groups. As we do not all need an equal level of
intensive care (eg we do not all need maximum advanced
life support now, nor do we all want it if we were to
become seriously ill), equity is often defined as ‘treating
equals equally, and unequals unequally with respect to
their relevant inequality’. In the case of life support, for
instance, morally relevant dimensions of inequality might
be considered need or ability to benefit, while irrelevant
dimensions might be considered gender or sexual orienta-
tion. Fair rationing, then, would operate cognizant of the
former criteria and blind to the latter.
Although most communities prohibit discriminatory treat-
ment, evidence of differential healthcare on the basis of
age and ethnicity is growing. Different communities also
focus on different dimensions of discrimination. In the
USA, for example, ability to pay is routinely used as a cri-
terion for access to hospital care. In Canada, this criterion
is considered unacceptable. Past or future societal contri-
butions are other morally controversial criteria for
rationing ICU services equitably. A 1989 publication on
utilization strategies for ICUs declared that rationing as it
was then practised was biased and inequitable [8], citing
physician self-reports of different care based on patients’
contributions to society [9,10]. In a comparison of expen-
ditures on patients who die in neonatal and adult ICUs,
care of the non-surviving elderly required a far greater pro-
portion of resources than care of the non-surviving new-
borns [11]. These investigators suggested that it may be
more justifiable to ration intensive care for the very old
than the very young.
Professional positions and empiric studies on
rationing critical care
The rubric of rationing healthcare is influenced by many
disciplines. Foremost among them is ethics. Ethical prin-
ciples have been previously applied to such complex
issues as informed consent, brain death, organ transplanta-
tion, organ donation, resuscitation, and the administration,
withholding and withdrawal of life support. The promi-
nence of ethical dilemmas as they relate to rationing criti-
cal care has been captured in several consensus statements
and position papers on futility [12], triaging [13], and the
allocation of medical resources [14,15].
Although rationing according to need tends to be profes-
sionally comfortable and publicly acceptable, this
approach can run counter to utility principles when one
very needy patient consumes a disproportionate amount
of healthcare resources. The classic ‘rule of rescue’ when
life is threatened [16] represents the founding spirit of
intensive care medicine. However, directing ICU
resources where they are needed most may not maximize
the probability of individual patient benefit. All inten-
sivists who triage have been faced with a choice of
whether to give the last ICU bed to a patient who appears
most in need (eg the sickest) versus a patient who is most
R2 Critical Care 1999, Vol 3 No 1likely to benefit from treatment (eg not always the
sickest). A survey of the Society of Critical Care Medicine
suggested that critical care providers were not inclined to
make choices about distributing limited resources on the
basis of who might benefit most [17].
A slowly growing number of empiric studies are describing
healthcare rationing. Under conditions of an ICU nursing
shortage in Boston between 1980 and 1981 [18], the active
beds decreased from 18 to 8 and monthly admissions
decreased from 122 to 95. Following the bed shortage, the
proportion of patients admitted for monitoring decreased,
the proportion of intubated patients increased, and
patients were transferred out of the ICU sooner. Although
more patients with acute myocardial infarction were
admitted to non-ICU beds during the rationing period,
their mortality rates were similar. Another observational
study showed that patients who were admitted to the ICU
during a bed shortage were sicker than those admitted
when there were many beds available [19]. More recently,
in a 3-month observational study describing referrals to six
ICUs in the UK, 480 patients were admitted and 165 were
refused. Although adjustment for case mix was limited for
patients who were refused admission, 37% of patients
admitted to ICU had died, compared with 46% of patients
who were refused entry 90 days after ICU referral [20].
Interpretation of these interesting data is somewhat
limited without knowing about illness severity measures
for admitted and non-admitted patients or about the uti-
lization of intermediate care units.
Conclusions
While many stakeholders such as clinicians, patients, the
public, and administrators, should have a voice in health-
care rationing at the policy level, engaging all relevant
parties in a meaningful manner is challenging. To what
extent intensivists take a leadership role in the dialogue in
such settings is variable. Rationing issues are ideally influ-
enced by interdisciplinary input from diverse perspectives
outside of healthcare professions such as epidemiology,
economics, ethics, philosophy, law and political science.
Discussion about health resource allocation should not
take place only in classrooms and boardrooms. Increas-
ingly, intensivists are called upon to balance their role as
patient advocate and health resource manager for society.
Although this can create a sense of conflict for us, we are
most likely to become aware of our daily rationing deci-
sions if we make them in light of both responsibilities.
Whether autonomy, utility and equity (or any other princi-
ples for that matter) are consciously considered when we
ration is unclear.
The growing number of studies and professional docu-
ments on rationing notwithstanding, the extent to which
intensivists are actually aware of, or informed by, these
publications is questionable. Understanding ICU resource
allocation begins with knowing what goes on today. How
do we currently balance patient self-determination with
fiscally responsible care? What are the socio-cultural deter-
minants of such decisions? Are we able to recognize the
tacit personal beliefs and community values that motivate
our rationing decisions? How are we influenced by per-
sonal incentives when caring for critically ill patients
under conditions of resource constraints? Is life support
withdrawn sooner from moribund patients when resources
are scarce than when they are not? Investigating the for-
merly silent problem of rationing is central to understand-
ing the practice of medicine as we approach the next
millenium. Modern health service research agendas will
find such lines of inquiry enlightening and highly relevant
to healthcare policy.
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